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WORK OF APPELLATE COURTS-1976-1977
CRIMINAL TRIAL AND POSTCONVICTION PROCEDURE
Cheney C. Joseph, Jr. *
OPENING STATEMENT
In State v. Green,1 a negligent homicide case, the district attorney
informed the jury in the opening statement that the state would offer
evidence of a blood alcohol test to prove that the defendant was intox-
icated at the time of the automobile accident in which the victim was
killed.2 However, when the district attorney attempted to introduce the
evidence, the trial court sustained a defense objection based on the state's
failure to comply with certain requirements of the statute governing
admissibility of such tests.3 The trial court nevertheless denied the defend-
ant's motion for a mistrial and admonished the jury that the district
attorney's opening statement was not evidence and could not be con-
sidered.
The supreme court upheld the denial of a mistrial. The court cited
with approval an earlier rape case' in which the district attorney in the
opening statement told the jury that the state would offer medical findings
to prove intercourse. Although no medical evidence was introduced, the
* Associate Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 343 So. 2d 149 (La. 1977).
2. The district attorney said:
The State is going to show you by competent evidence that at the time this
accident happened that this defendant didn't even realize that there was a red
light at this particular intersection, he didn't even realize it. Why didn't he
realize it? The State is going to show you by competent evidence, we're going
to introduce the nurse who extracted blood from his arm, the defendant's arm,
at the hospital. It was taken to the crime lab in New Iberia where it was
analyzed and it showed that his man had a blood alcohol content by weight of
.30. Under the law of Louisiana a person with a blood alcohol content of .10 is
presumed to be intoxicated. This man is three times past that presumption. The
State is going to show you because of this condition this is why he didn't know
there was even a red light at this particular intersection.
343 So. 2d at 151.
3. LA. R.S. 32:661(c) (Supp. 1972). The court noted that the trial court's
reason for excluding the evidence was that the "consent form" signed by the
defendant prior to the test failed to recite the fact that the defendant was advised of
his rights prior to the test. The court assumed but did not decide that the trial court's
ruling excluding the evidence was correct. 343 So. 2d at 152.
4. State v. Shaffer, 260 La. 605, 257 So. 2d 121 (1971).
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court upheld the trial court's denial of a mistrial. The court in both cases
relied on the principle that the prosecutor's opening remarks are designed
merely to guide the jury and that the jury is able to distinguish between
what counsel says he will prove and what he actually proves. In Green,
the court was impressed with the trial court's finding that the prosecutor
was in good faith in alluding to the alcohol test.
Had the court determined that the district attorney was not in good
faith a different result may have followed. How the court will determine
the district attorney's good faith is an unresolved question. The court will
undoubtedly not merely evaluate the subjective sentiments of the prosecu-
tor toward the evidence. For example, if he should reasonably have
known, based on clear and positive past decisions of the court, that such
evidence was inadmissible, good faith should not be found and mistrials
should be ordered. Ignorance of law should not be a defense for a
prosecutor.
All things considered, the writer agrees with the court's approach. No
doubt, as Justice Tate wrote, dissenting, 5 the jury was aware of the fact
that the state had the evidence available. The evidence was extremely
damaging in view of the circumstances of the case. Whether the jury could
really set aside the district attorney's reference to such evidence is doubt-
ful. However, the fact that the state is required by law6 to make an opening
statement lends support to the majority view. Some prosecutors give a
detailed rendition of their expected evidence so that the jurors know
exactly what to expect. Such a strategy is not beyond the spirit of a
mandatory opening statement. At least one purpose of the article7 barring
evidence outside the scope of the opening statement is to prevent surprise
to the defendant.8
The situation presented could have been avoided by a proper proce-
dure for the pretrial determination of the admissibility of such evidence.
The answer, the writer submits, lies in full pretrial disclosure by the
district attorney with the corresponding obligation on the part of defense
counsel to raise challenges in advance of trial.9 The lack of proper
5. Justices Tate, Dennis and Calogero dissented.
6. LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 766.
7. Id. art. 769.
8. Id. This article further mandates exclusion of evidence not fairly within the
scope of the opening statement.
9. Defense counsel possibly could have raised this issue prior to trial by
moving to suppress. The court has stated that the trial court may entertain a motion,
based on Code of Criminal Procedure article 3, to suppress evidence not covered by
article 703. State v. Wilkerson, 261 La. 342, 259 So. 2d 871 (1972). The defendant
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procedural devices to prevent such situations from arising may provide
some excuse for leniency when such errors occur.
In State v. Spot, 0 the supreme court upheld the trial court's failure to
require the state to make an opening statement in a felony trial before the
trial court sitting without a jury. The district attorney was permitted
without defense objection to waive the opening statement." Although the
court noted that the failure of defendant to object normally precludes
review of the issue, 12 the court nevertheless discussed its merits.
Discussing the prior cases,1 3 the court said, absent a showing of
unfair surprise, the state's failure to give an opening statement in felony' 4
and misdemeanor cases tried without a jury is not error. The writer agrees.
The logic of the earlier cases' 5 relates the function of the opening state-
ment to the necessity of informing the jury rather than to providing a
discovery device for the accused. These cases alluded to the fact that the
steps' 6 preceding the presentation of evidence were not applicable to
bench trials. This logic applies to bench trials of both felony and misde-
meanor cases.
The court's position does not deny the trial court the discretion to
order the state to make an opening statement in a bench trial. It merely
upholds the trial court's exercise of that discretion by a refusal to require
one in cases tried without juries. Presumably the court has not excluded
the possibility that a complex matter being tried before the trial court
would necessitate an opening statement by the state to apprise the trial
judge and the defendant in outline form of the evidence the district
attorney will offer.
DEFENDANT'S RIGHT TO DISCOVER JUROR VOTING PRACTICES
In two recent cases, 17 defense counsel complained of the district
has certain disclosure rights by statute. See LA. CODE CRIM. P. arts. 716-729.6; LA.
R.S. 32:661-669 (Supp. 1977).
10. 340 So. 2d 1349 (La. 1976).
11. Id. at 1350.
12. Id. See LA. CODE CRIM. P. arts. 841, 920.
13. State v. Bolen, 338 So. 2d 97 (La. 1976); State v. Himel, 260 La. 949, 257
So. 2d 670 (1972); State v. Didier, 259 La. 967, 254 So. 2d 262 (1971).
14. In felony cases, unless the defendant waives trial by jury the case is tried
before a jury. LA. CONST. art. I, § 17.
15. State v. Himel, 260 La. 949, 257 So. 2d 670 (1972); State v. Didier, 259 La.
967, 254 So. 2d 262 (1971).
16. LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 765.
17. State v. Holmes, 347 So. 2d 221 (La. 1977); State v. Wright, 344 So. 2d 1014
(La. 1977). Both cases involve prosecutions in Orleans Parish.
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attorney's unwillingness to share data collected by assistant district attor-
neys on prospective jurors' prior voting records. 18
In State v. Wright, 19 the defendant requested a copy of the district
attorney's list prior to commencement of trial. Although this request was
refused by the trial court, defense counsel was permitted to ask prospec-
tive jurors on voir dire whether they had served on prior cases and, if so,
what case. The trial court would not permit questioning concerning the
verdict in such cases or the prospective juror's vote during his earlier
service. The trial court noted that availability of clerks' records to show
the prior cases tried and the verdict in those cases.'
In affirming the conviction, the supreme court noted the granting of
writs in State v. Holmes2 to determine whether the state could claim a
"work-product" privilege concerning the collected data. The court also
noted the failure of the record in Wright to show either that the district
attorney used the information in jury selection or that the information was
unavailable to defense counsel through other sources. 22
In State v. Holmes,23 the court wisely took the matter under con-
sideration on writs prior to trial.24 In Holmes, the trial court had ordered
production of the lists and the state sought writs of review. The supreme
court found no need to confront the "work-product" issue because it
found no statutory or constitutional ground on which the trial court could
order production of the state's data. Although defense counsel established
18. In State v. Holmes, 347 So. 2d 221, 222 (La. 1977), the procedure was
described:
The practice in the District Attorney's Office is to record the vote in some
manner by the Assistant District Attorney who handled the case, usually by
marking on the jury list (marked Court's Exhibit *1). The Assistant District
Attorney who records the vote then sends it to the secretary of the Trial
Division, where copies are made and distributed to the respective Sections of
Court. The Assistant in each Section, if he so chooses, logs the vote of the
particular juror on his jury venire (marked Court's Exhibit *2) which he or she
receives at the beginning of the month from the Jury Commissioner.
See also State v. Wright, 344 So. 2d 1014, 1015 (La. 1977).
19. 344 So. 2d 1014 (La. 1977).
20. See id. at 1016 (trial court per curiam).
21. Id. The court noted that writs were granted to review the question concern-
ing the existence of a state "work product" privilege to withhold the records. For
the granting of writs, see State v. Holmes, 342 So. 2d 672 (La. 1977).
22. 344 So. 2d at 1017.
23. 347 So. 2d 221 (La. 1977).
24. After conviction, the reversal involves questions of "harmless error" and
the loss of much effort in the lower court. Matters of policy are best resolved in
advance of trial.
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the unavailability of the information from other sources, the court reversed
the trial judge's order, finding that no showing of undue hardship or
injustice had been shown because the voir dire had not yet been conduct-
ed. The court clearly said that the defendant should be entitled in voir dire
to ask:
"(1) Have you ever served on a criminal jury before?
(2) What was the charge in that case?
(3) What was the verdict in the case?, etc." 25
Presumably, by permitting defense counsel to ask the above questions, the
court evened the scales. It is only when defense counsel may not ask 26
such questions of prospective jurors on voir dire that the state's possession
of this information gives it an advantage.
Whether defense counsel may ask how the prospective juror himself
voted is an unresolved question. 27 Following the three listed questions is
an "etc." Whether the "etc." includes the right to ask prospective jurors
who have previously served how they voted could be very significant. The
writer suggests that a simple solution would be to permit the question if the
state has the information available but will not disclose it to defense
counsel. 2
The writer feels that the court's approach is fair. However, as ex-
pressed by Justice Tate in dissent, 29 the Code of Criminal Procedure 30
permits the trial court to regulate the proceedings before it. Absent a
contrary statute, constitutional provision, or judicially recognized
privilege, the trial court should have the discretion to order production of
records if this would aid in the fair administration of justice.
25. 347 So. 2d at 223. The court said it overruled State v. Roquemore, 292 So.
2d 204 (La. 1974), State v. Spencer, 257 La. 672, 243 So. 2d 793 (1971), and State v.
Martin, 250 La. 705, 198 So. 2d 897 (1967), which were in conflict with the court's
opinion that defense counsel is entitled to propose those questions to prospective
jurors on voir dire.
26. Presumably jurors will answer truthfully. If not, remedies are available. See
LA. CODE CRAM. P. arts. 775(6), 851(4).
27. In a later case, State v. McGhee, 350 So. 2d 370 (La. 1977), the court, in a
footnote (footnote 8), noted the court's failure to resolve the question. Justice
Calogero, author of McGhee, in the footnote said he would allow defense counsel
to inquire how the juror himself voted and would not restrict him to an inquiry
regarding the verdict alone.
28. See State v. McGhee, 350 So. 2d 370 (La. 1977).
29. 347 So. 2d at 224-25.
30. See LA. CODE CRIM. P. arts. 3, 17.
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DEFENDANT'S RIGHT TO COMPULSORY PROCESS
The defendant's right to present a defense and to compulsory process
for witnesses to testify on his behalf is beyond question. 31 The extent to
which that right entitles him to a recess to procure witnesses, to the
issuance of subpoenas to prisoners in federal institutions outside the state,
and to the aid of a private investigator to locate a witness was discussed by
the court in three recent cases.32
In State v. Mizell, 33 the defendant sought the attendance of his
brother, a prisoner in the custody of the Department of Corrections. His
brother would purportedly have testified that he alone, and not the defend-
ant, stole the calf for which both he and the defendant were prosecuted.
The defendant's brother had previously pled guilty and was sentenced to
serve eighteen months at hard labor.
More than two weeks prior to trial defense counsel properly requested
the issuance of a subpoena to the defendant's brother giving his address as
"Angola State Prison, Angola, Louisiana." The prisoner had apparently 34
been transferred to the prison at DeQuincy. Rather than forward the
subpoena for service, the sheriff simply returned the subpoena unserved.
Apparently no effort was made to locate the witness other than to send the
subpoena to the sheriff of the parish in which Angola State Prison lies.
On the morning of the trial, after trial had commenced, defense
counsel realized that his witness was not available to testify. The trial court
denied the defendant's request to continue the case until he could have his
witness available to testify. The supreme court reversed the conviction.
The court was willing to ignore certain procedural problems pointed
out by the Chief Justice in his dissent3" and go straight to the heart of the
matter. Compulsory process was seen as more than the right to the
enforcement of only such subpoenas as are actually served. The writer
31. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI; LA. CONST. art. I, § 16.
32. State v. Madison, 345 So. 2d 485 (La. 1977); State v. Phillips, 343 So. 2d
1047 (La. 1977); State v. Mizell, 341 So. 2d 385 (La. 1976).
33. 341 So. 2d 385 (La. 1976).
34. The record is discussed in 341 So. 2d at 386-87.
35. The trial had commenced so a recess, not a continuance, should have been
requested. The court treated the defendant's motion for a continuance as a request
for a recess and relieved the defendant of following the procedural requisites for a
continuance. 341 So. 2d at 386 n. 1. The court also quickly disposed of the state's
argument that the defendant should be denied relief for failure to request a writ of
habeas corpus ad testificandum. Id. at 387 n.2.
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submits that under Mizell it is the right to have diligence exercised in
having them served.
In State v. Madison,36 the defendant, an indigent, sought funds from
the trial court to employ a private investigator to help him locate a witness
whom he claimed to be crucial. The court affirmed the trial court's refusal
to order the expenditure of funds, but recognized the possible validity of
the defendant's argument, holding that in this case the defendant had
failed to make a sufficient showing of need to justify expending funds for
an investigator. The defense counsel had merely asserted the need for the
witness. The court noted its sympathy with defense counsel's desire to
avoid disclosing to the state in advance of trial the theory of his defense,
but suggested that defense counsel should have sought a private hearing in
which to establish for the record a "full explanation of his request." 37 The
defendant's failure to do so precluded review of the trial court's denial of
his request.
Although the defense contentions and the court's treatment of them
centered on equal protection 38 and the right to effective counsel, 39 the
writer respectfully submits that this matter could be seen in light of the
right to compulsory process. If a defendant is entitled to summon witnes-
ses on his own behalf, he surely must be entitled, given a proper showing,
to aid in locating them for that purpose. It is not always practical to expect
law enforcement personnel to locate defense witnesses. However, ap-
pointed counsel may be unable to devote the time necessary both to locate
missing witnesses and to prepare a defense. When the defendant is in
custody this is a particular problem. While there is obviously no simple
formula, it seems clear that under some circumstances a defendant is
effectively denied the right to call a witness if he lacks the means to locate
and identify him so that a subpoena can be served.
RIGHT TO TRIAL BY JURY-JOINDER OF MISDEMEANOR OFFENSES
In State v. McCarroll' the defendants4 were charged with multiple
counts of misdemeanor assault and battery. The offenses arose in a single
36. 345 So. 2d 485 (La. 1977).
37. Id. at 490.
38. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956), cited and discussed in 345 So. Zd at
490.
39. See 345 So. 2d at 490.
40. 337 So. 2d 475 (La. 1976).
41. Several defendants' cases were consolidated for the appeal.
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incident4 2 and no issue was raised regarding the propriety of the joinder of
offenses for trial. The cases were tried before the trial court without a jury
and without advising the defendants of their right to have the matter tried
before a jury."' Two defendants were convicted following trial; one
entered a plea of guilty. 44
The court, in a well reasoned opinion by Justice Dennis, determined
that under article I, section 17 of the Louisiana Constitution 5 the right to
jury trial depends upon the maximum penalty which may be imposed in
the case. The court seems clearly to understand the term "case" to mean a
single indictment or information if it charges several joined offenses.
When more than one offense is charged in an indictment, the aggregate of
the penalties to which the defendant is exposed determines the right to trial
by jury. Although the defendant's sentences did exceed six months, that
does not appear to be the determining rationale. In Duncan v. Louisiana ,46
the United States Supreme Court did not concern itself with the actual
sentence, but rather only with whether the possible jail sentence exceeded
six months. Subsequently, however, in Codispoti v. Pennsylvania47 the
Court addressed itself to the actual sentence. Codispoti involved a post-
trial contempt proceeding involving multiple allegations of contempt.
42. The defendants entered a restaurant armed with shotguns and threatened
the victims. One of the defendants also committed a simple battery on one of the
victims. Each assault and battery exposed the defendant to a maximum sentence of
imprisonment for over six months.
43. Defense counsel did not move for a jury trial; nor did the record reflect that
trial court advised the defendants of their right to trial by jury. The supreme court
thus found no waiver of the right from failure to object. 337 So. 2d at 480-81.
44. All of the defendants were sentenced to terms of imprisonment exceeding
six months. Moore was sentenced to serve four and one-half years. Frank McCar-
roll was sentenced to serve four years. Earl McCarroll was sentenced to serve two
years.
45. LA. CONST. art. I, § 17 provides:
Section 17. A criminal case in which the punishment may be capital shall
be tried before a jury of twelve persons, all of whom must concur to render a
verdict. A case in which the punishment is necessarily confinement at hard
labor shall be tried before a jury of twelve persons, ten of whom must concur
to render a verdict. A case in which the punishment may be confinement at
hard labor or confinement without hard labor for more than six months shall be
tried before a jury of six persons, five of whom must concur to render a
verdict. The accused shall have a right to full voir dire examination of prospec-
tive jurors and to challenge jurors peremptorily. The number of challenges
shall be fixed by law. Except in capital cases, a defendant may knowingly and
intelligently waive his right to a trial by jury.
46. 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
47. 418 U.S. 506 (1974).
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Whether the United States Supreme Court would agree with the Louisiana
Supreme Court's analysis of the federal constitutional issue in such cases
is presently academic, since reliance is clearly upon the Louisiana
Constitution. The possible sentence, not the actual sentence, governs the
defendant's right to jury trial in cases of joined offenses in Louisiana.
The question of offenses not joined but tried in sequence before the
same judge is not raised and no answer is suggested. Whether the term
"case" used in article I, section 17 of the Louisiana Constitution only
applies to indictments containing joined offenses and not to separate
indictments charging offenses arising from the same episode or transaction
could be critical. Suppose, for example, a defendant is arrested for second
offense driving while intoxicated48 and during the course of the arrest
strikes two of the arresting officers 49 and threatens a third with a knife. 50 If
the state charges him in a single bill of information including all offenses,
under McCarroll the case must be tried before a jury absent defendant's
waiver of that right. If, on the other hand, the state files a separate bill of
information for each offense, no single conviction exposes him to impri-
sonment for over six months. Nevertheless, if the state tries each offense
separately before the same judge, the effect is very similar to a multiple
count indictment. The only difference is the fact that the evidence must be
reintroduced each time. It is noteworthy that Code 'of Criminal Procedure
article 706 permits the defendant to move to consolidate for trial in such a
situation.51 However, consolidation is discretionary with the trial court. It
may be that the burden would then shift to the defendant to move to
consolidate if he wishes his case to be heard by a jury. The trial court
would then exercise its discretion in allowing or denying consolidation,
and the attendant jury trial right.
APPEARANCE OF THE DEFENDANT
In State v. Burnette52 during the progress of an armed robbery trial
the defendant cursed and threw an ashtray at the trial judge. Rather than
exclude the defendant, the trial judge had him handcuffed and gagged.
48. LA. R.S. 14:98 (Supp. 1975).
49. Id. 14:35 (Supp. 1968). Each officer struck is a separate battery under State
v. McCarroll, 337 So. 2d 475 (La. 1976).
50. LA. R.S. 14:37 (Supp. 1968).
51. The defendant can move to consolidate if the offenses could have been
joined for trial. See State v. Laurent, 290 So. 2d 809 (La. 1974).
52. 337 So. 2d 1096 (La. 1976).
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Noting the wide discretion to maintain order and decorum accorded trial
courts by the United States Supreme Court in Illinois v. Allen," the court
upheld the procedure employed in this case.
The writer certainly agrees that trial judges should not be exposed to
physical injury.54 The opinion does not state whether the defendant was
warned not to engage in such conduct and given a chance to behave prior
to being gagged and handcuffed. This should indeed not matter regarding
the handcuffing. The accused should not be given a second chance to
inflict injury on the judge once he has displayed such propensities. How-
ever, prior to gagging the defendant and thereby depriving him not only of
the chance to curse the judge, but also of the ability to confer with counsel,
the court should give warning. 5 In an earlier case, State v. Brewer,56 the
court reversed the conviction of one defendant and affirmed the conviction
of another when both were shackled and gagged following an outburst at
trial. In Brewer, although both defendants participated in the outburst,
only one so clearly indicated his intention to disrupt the proceedings as to
merit the gag and shackles. Neither defendant in Brewer was warned prior
to being shackled and gagged. The supreme court, however, found no
difficulty upholding the trial court's action where the defendant's conduct
was blatant and outrageous. The conduct displayed in Burnette was
similarly blatant and indicated the defendant's unequivocal desire to
disrupt.
When a defendant misbehaves there is no constitutional bar to exclu-
sion under appropriate circumstances. However, article 831 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure mandates the presence of an accused in a felony case.
Only his temporary, voluntary absence is excused by article 832. Possibly
this causes some Louisiana trial judges to feel that until the legislation is
amended to reflect the authority to exclude unruly defendants, they are
limited to binding and gagging those whose conduct justifies such action.
The legislature should consider enacting legislation similar to Rule 43(b)
of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure to clarify the trial court's
authority to exclude disruptive defendants. 57
53. 397 U.S. 337 (1970).
54. The opinion reflects the fact that the ash tray actually struck the trial judge.
Whether serious injury was in fact caused or not, the danger was certainly present.
55. Such a warning is required prior to exclusion. See Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S.
337 (1970); State v. Brewer, 301 So. 2d 630 (La. 1974).
56. 301 So. 2d 630 (La. 1974).
57. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 43(b):
(b) Continued Presence Not Required. The further progress of the trial to
and including the return of the verdict shall not be prevented and the defendant
[Vol. 38
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DEFENDANT'S RIGHT TO TESTIFY
In State v. Lovett58 the supreme court accorded to the defendant in
criminal trials the right to testify in the jury's presence concerning the
circumstances surrounding his confession59 without being subject to cross-
examination on the "whole case. 60 The court further indicated, by way
of preference, 6 that the defendant should be given the opportunity to
present his version as well as to offer any other evidence to diminish the
weight of the confession, "contemporaneously with the state's evidence
as predicated." 6 2 The writer assumes that the practical effect would be to
go through the familiar foundation outside the presence of the jury, then to
repeat the entire process in the presence of the jury. 63
Louisiana has for many years permitted the defendant to testify in the
proceedings leading to a determination of the admissibility of the con-
fession without being subject to examination on other matters. 6 This is
seen as a rule of fairness dictated by the need to allow the accused to
challenge the police testimony on the voluntariness of his confession
without being compelled on cross-examination to incriminate himself. The
same result could have been reached by permitting the defendant to testify
and then not permitting the state to use his testimony against him in any
later proceedings in the case. 65 However, employing a "narrow rule'66 of
cross-examination practically had the same effect.
shall be considered to have waived his right to be present whenever a defend-
ant, initially present,
(1) voluntarily absents himself after the trial has commenced
(whether or not he has been informed by the court of his obligation to
remain during the trial), or
(2) after being warned by the court that disruptive conduct will
cause him to be removed from the courtroom, persists in conduct which is
such as to justify his being excluded from the courtroom.
58. 345 So. 2d 1139 (La. 1977).
59. The right would presumably also apply whenever the state intends to offer
evidence of any statement requiring a showing of Miranda warnings or a showing
of the free and voluntary nature of the confession.
60. See LA. R.S. 15:280 (Supp. 1967).
61. 345 So. 2d at 1143.
62. Id.
63. A trial court ruling favorable to the state on the admissibility of the con-
fession is of course needed to offer the confession to the jury.
64. See State v. Thomas, 208 La. 548, 23 So. 2d 212 (1945) for an excellent
discussion of the purpose of the rule.
65. See Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377 (1968).
66. In some jurisdictions the cross-examination is limited to matters covered in
19781
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When the defendant is permitted to testify before the jury under a
narrow rule of cross-examination,67 he has a valuable chance for the jury
to see and hear him deny the voluntary nature of the confession. The
district attorney is only permitted to examine him on the matter testified to
on direct, i.e., the circumstances surrounding the confession. Just as this
procedure was earlier seen as the only fair way to allow the defendant
effectively to challenge the confession's admissibility, it was seen in
Lovett as the only fair way to enable him to challenge the confession's
weight.
The writer has no philosophical reservations concerning the court's
authority to limit the scope of cross-examination of a particular party (i.e.,
the defendant) in certain types of cases (i.e., criminal cases).
Practical problems may arise if the defendant's testimony goes be-
yond the confession itself and, in effect, denies guilt. Should such situa-
tions arise, the state should be entitled either to have the trial court charge
the jury concerning the limited nature of the defendant's testimony or to
broaden his cross-examination to include all matters covered on direct.
The trial court should be given broad authority to choose the proper
remedy.
Practical problems may also arise from an interruption of the state's
case to permit the defendant to offer evidence "contemporaneously" with
the state's predicate concerning the confession. The normal order of trial
need not be disrupted to achieve the purposes sought by allowing the
defendant to testify under a narrow rule of cross-examination. The expres-
sion of preference68 by the supreme court is certainly a guide to trial
courts. However, if the trial court should prefer to follow the normal order
of trial and to allow the state to complete its case prior to defendant's
presentation of evidence, the failure to follow the supreme court's prefer-
ence ought not result in reversal. As long as the defendant's evidence goes
to the jury, any error due to failure to follow the preferred procedure
should be deemed harmless 69 unless the supreme court feels the need to
enforce its preference by reversal of convictions.
the direct examination. See FED. R. EvID. 611(b) with comments. Louisiana adopt-
ed the broad rule of cross-examination in criminal cases. See LA. R.S. 15:280
(Supp. 1967). See also Justice Tate's discussion in State v. Lovett, 345 So. 2d at
1141.
67. Earlier cases holding that the defendant was entitled to testify in the jury's
presence only by subjecting himself to cross-examination on the whole case were
overruled. 345 So. 2d at 1142.
68. Id. at 1143.
69. LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 921.
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MISTRIAL-APPLICATION OF THE CONTEMPORANEOUS OBJECTION RULE
The supreme court recently decided two cases70 relating the contem-
poraneous objection rule to the mistrial provisions of the Code of Criminal
Procedure. In State v. Lawson, 7 1 the district attorney made a prohibited
reference to an unrelated crime72 in a question 73 during direct examination
of a state witness. Upon defense counsel's objection to the question, the
prosecutor immediately apologized and the question was never an-
swered. 74 No motion for a mistrial was made by defense counsel.
Nevertheless, following a conference at the bench between the court and
counsel, the trial court ordered a mistrial. 75 Defense counsel did not object
to the ordering of a mistrial. However, when the case was brought again
for trial defense counsel argued that the retrial was barred by double
jeopardy.
The court found that the trial court's action in ordering a mistrial
without the consent of the defendant was erroneous. Despite the district
attorney's error, the situation was not one falling within the scope of Code
of Criminal Procedure article 775 which authorizes the trial court to grant
a mistrial on its own motion. 76 When inadmissible other crimes evidence
is erroneously injected, the defendant's remedy is found in article 770
which does require a defendant's motion. The defendant may be satisfied
to proceed to verdict with an admonition by the trial court to the jury to
disregard the evidence or remark.
77
However, the court found that the defendant's failure to object 78 to
the mistrial precluded him from later complaining of the trial court's
ordering the mistrial without a defense motion.
70. State v. Ervin, 340 So. 2d 1379 (La. 1976); State v. Lawson, 338 So. 2d 627
(La. 1976).
71. 338 So. 2d 627 (La. 1976).
72. See LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 770; State v. Meshell, 332 So. 2d 767 (La. 1976).
73. The colloquy is found in 338 So. 2d at 629 n.3.
74. That, of course, would not cure the error. See State v. Meshell, 332 So. 2d
767 (La. 1976).
75. 338 So. 2d at 629 n.3.
76. The only possible ground was "a legal defect in the proceedings which
would make any judgment entered upon a verdict reversible as a matter of law."
LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 775(3).
77. Id. art. 770.
78. See id. art. 841. The defendant contended that the trial court cut his
objection short. This was not the high court's finding from reviewing the record.
338 So. 2d at 631. See also the colloquy at 338 So. 2d at 629 n.3.
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The writer is satisfied that the result is fair. If the defendant had an
objection to the mistrial he was given an opportunity to make his com-
plaint known. 9 To have reached a contrary result would have been a
miscarriage of justice. The trial judge was obviously acting in good faith to
assure a fair adjudication of the issue of guilt. To bar subsequent proceed-
ings would have allowed the defendant to take advantage of his own
failure to complain of steps taken to assure a fair trial.
In State v. Ervin,8° during his trial for burglary of a home, the
defendant called a girl friend to testify as to an alibi. The witness testified
that she was with the accused on the night on which the burglary occurred.
On cross-examinationf by the state, she said she saw the defendant almost
daily between 1972 and 1975. The prosecutor then, out of the presence of
the jury, informed the trial court that the defendant was in the state prison
at Angola from October, 1973 until September, 1974. With the jury still
out of the courtroom, the witness clarified her testimony. She said she saw
the accused only a few times during the year he was in prison. The
prosecutor requested that the witness clarify her testimony for the jury.
When the jury returned, the witness testified that from October, 1973 until
September, 1974, she saw the accused only a few times. 81 The district
attorney then asked where she had seen him. Defense counsel objected to
the question because it sought to allude to the fact of the accused's prior
conviction. The objection was overruled and the witness answered that she
saw the accused "at Angola." 82
On appeal, the state argued that the defendant could not complain
because he failed to move for a mistrial after the witness answered the
question. The supreme court properly found that no such motion was
required because the trial court was already aware of the defense objection
to the evidence being admitted. To assume that the trial judge would have
changed his opinion regarding the propriety of the question and response is
not logical. To require a subsequent motion for a mistrial to preserve the
issue for review would have unjustly prevented the defendant from com-
plaining of the trial court's erroneous ruling.
DOUBLE JEOPARDY-RETRIAL FOLLOWING MISTRIALS
Generally, when the defendant seeks a mistrial, a reprosecution is not
barred by double jeopardy. Article 591 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
79. But see defendant's argument to the contrary, 338 So. 2d at 631.
80. 340 So. 2d 1379 (La. 1976).
81. Id. at 1380.
82. Id.
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incorporates that concept.8 3 However, the United States Supreme Court
has recognized the possibility that bad faith conduct by the prosecutor
intended to provoke a mistrial may present a different picture. To permit
the state's attorney to provoke a mistrial in order to avoid an acquittal
would subject the defendant to harassment by successive prosecutions. In
United States v. Dinitz,84 the United States Supreme Court saw the double
jeopardy clause as a protection against "governmental actions intended to
provoke mistrial requests.' '85
In State v. Wesley,86 the defendant was convicted after three mis-
trials.8 7 Two of the mistrials were granted on defendant's motion due to
comments of the district attorney during the opening or closing state-
ment. 8
The supreme court recognized its authority to prevent retrials if the
error causing the mistrial is so egregious as to give rise to an imputation of
bad faith on the part of the district attorney. However, after evaluating the
two alleged prosecutorial errors occasioning the prior mistrials, the court
concluded that on neither occasion was the district attorney displaying the
sort of bad faith prosecutorial overreaching which would necessitate in-
voking double jeopardy protections to prevent unfairness.
The writer agrees with the result and is sure that the court will not
invoke such protection except in the most aggravated circumstances. It is,
of course, normally sufficient protection for the accused to be able to stop
the trial when prejudicial error has been committed.
In order to protect both the state and the accused in a situation
involving the possibility of bad faith behavior on the part of a prosecutor,
the trial court should consider denying the motion for a mistrial, thereby
83. See also LA. CONST. art. I, § 15.
84. 424 U.S. 600 (1976).
85. Id. at 611.
86. 347 So. 2d 217 (La. 1977).
87. One mistrial followed the inability of the jury to reach a verdict. It was
conceded that this was ordinarily no bar to retrial. The defendant nevertheless
argued that the protection provided by the double jeopardy clause at some point
prevents the state from retrying a defendant when it cannot secure a guilty verdict.
The supreme court did no more than recognize that such a point might exist; but
even so, it had not been reached in this case.
88. In one trial the prosecutor mentioned the codefendant's six month jail
sentence in closing argument. In another trial, the prosecutor mentioned in the
opening statement an inculpatory statement by the defendant. In both cases, the
trial court granted defense motions due to alleged prejudice to the accused as a
result of the remarks.
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allowing the accused the opportunity to be acquitted (or convicted of a
lesser offense) and reserving to the defendant the opportunity to reurge his
complaint in a motion for a new trial in the event of a verdict of guilty. In
the context of a motion for a new trial, the issue could be evaluated in
more depth and appropriate sanctions invoked.89 The guilty should not
completely escape punishment because the district attorney commits re-
versible error.
DOUBLE JEOPARDY-SAME EVIDENCE TEST
In a series of recent cases 9° involving multiple prosecution for various
offenses arising from the same series of events, the supreme court evalu-
ated the purpose for which the evidence was offered in determining the
application of Louisiana's "same evidence" test."
In State v. Nichols 92 the defendants were charged with aggravated
battery and resisting arrest. 93 When the defendants were stopped by a state
police trooper for driving while intoxicated, they assaulted the officer. In
the course of their struggle, prior to the arrival of reinforcements to effect
the defendants' arrest, the defendants attacked the officer and used his
flashlight and radio microphone to batter him. Following their guilty pleas to
resisting arrest, they moved to quash the aggravated battery charges. 94
Although the charges arose from the same episode, the court, based on the
state's answer to a bill of particulars,95 determined that defendants resisted
arrest when they initially attacked the trooper. The aggravated battery
occurred later when they struck him with the flashlight and microphone.
Although these events were part of the same episode they were charged as
distinct offenses and the court determined that the state was entitled to
prosecute for both.
89. The prosecutor's conduct could conceivably violate ethical standards. He
may also be in contempt of court.
90. State ex rel. Smith v. Phelps, 345 So. 2d 446 (La. 1977); State v. Buckley,
344 So. 2d 980 (La. 1977); State v. Cotton, 341 So. 2d 362 (La. 1976); State v.
Nichols, 337 So. 2d 1074 (La. 1976).
91. See City of Baton Rouge v. Jackson, 310 So. 2d 596 (La. 1975); Wikberg v.
Henderson, 292 So. 2d 505 (La. 1974).
92. 337 So. 2d 1074 (La. 1976).
93. Other charges were brought but are not critical for the double jeopardy
discussion.
94. The trial court agreed and quashed the charges. The supreme court granted
writs which resulted in the instant decision.
95. Because the case involved a guilty plea to the resisting arrest charge and a
pretrial dismissal, the court had only the state's response to the bill of particulars to
frame the facts underlying the state's allegations.
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Similarly, in State v. Buckley,96 the defendant was charged in two
bills of information with distribution of marijuana. The two sales to the
same undercover agent occurred on the same date. The officer made one
purchase, drove down the road for a distance, then returned to make the
second purchase. The defendant was convicted first of one, then of the
other sale. 97 Following the first conviction, the defendant challenged the
state's right to prosecute him for the second sale on double jeopardy
grounds. The supreme court affirmed the second conviction on the theory
that the state charged two distinct offenses.
In State v. Cotton,98 the defendant was accused of aiding in the
robbery of a man named David. 99 During the course of the criminal
episode, in which the defendant and two others participated, David's
companion Brister was shot and killed by one of the robbers. l0 Following
Cotton's conviction for robbery of David, he moved to quash a second
degree murder indictment charging him with Brister's death. In answer to
a bill of particulars the state responded that it would not contend that the
killing was committed during the perpetration of the robbery of David.'°'
The trial court quashed the murder indictment but was reversed by the
supreme court. The robbery of David and killing of Brister were seen as
two distinct offenses committed during the same criminal episode.
In State ex rel. Smith v. Phelps, °2 Smith was convicted under
municipal ordinances in the mayor's court of aggravated assault, display-
ing dangerous weapons and disturbing the peace. 103 He was later convict-
ed in the district court of simple kidnapping of his estranged common law
96. 344 So. 2d 980 (La. 1977).
97. There were two separate trials.
98. 341 So. 2d 362 (La. 1976).
99. The defendant was charged with armed robbery and convicted of simple
robbery. See LA. R.S. 14:64-65 (Supp. 1966).
100. The state contended that all three actors were principals and hence respon-
sible for the others' offenses. See LA. R.S. 14:24 (1950).
101. The state's answer indicated that it would rely on the fact that the killing
was during the perpetration of an aggravated burglary.
102. 345 So. 2d 446 (La. 1977).
103. The assault and disturbing the peace ordinances are very similar to the title
14 offenses. The displaying dangerous weapons ordinance provided in pertinent
part as follows:
[I]t shall be unlawful for any person to . . .display . . . or exhibit with intent
to commit any crime or misdemeanor, or to intimidate any person, a pistol...
or other dangerous weapon within the corporate limits of the Town of
Winnsboro. . ..
TOWN OF WINNSBORO, LA., ORDINANCE No. 332, quoted in State ex rel. Smith v.
Phelps, 345 So. 2d 446, 448 (La. 1977).
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wife. He applied for a writ of habeas corpus on the ground that his district
court prosecution for kidnapping was barred by his prior convictions in the
mayor's courts. " The court first ordered a hearing to reconstruct the facts
of the mayor's court proceedings to determine the underlying facts of
those convictions.
The mayor's court convictions arose as a result of the defendant
confronting his former common law wife in a public place with a pistol.
He forced her to accompany him and threatened to shoot if others inter-
vened. He took her to his automobile and drove away. Affirming the
kidnapping conviction, the supreme court found that the municipal ordi-
nance convictions were based on the defendant's preliminary actions and
threatening conduct with the pistol. The kidnapping conviction was found
to be based on his forcing his former companion into his car and driving
away.
Each of these decisions recognized the fact that the "same evidence"
would likely be introduced in each trial. However, the court pointed to the
fact that the purpose of the evidence would be different. It might prove the
offense in one case, and simply complete the episode in another. The
opinions continually referred to the fact that the same evidence rule does
not bar multiple prosecutions when the defendant goes on a "crime
spree" 105 or commits several offenses in a single "criminal episode."'06
The writer submits that the logic of all four cases is very understand-
able and feels that the theory will be fairly easy for trial courts to apply. It
will, of course, permit the imaginative prosecutor to avoid double jeopar-
dy problems by arguing that the purpose of the evidence is different. For
example, in Nichols, he must, as he did, allege that the offense of
resisting arrest does not include hitting the trooper with the flashlight. He
may present the "same evidence" at trial as long as he clearly delineates
its different purposes.
DOUBLE JEOPARDY-STATE AND FEDERAL PROSECUTIONS
In State v. de la Beckwith1°7 and State v. Forbes,108 state prosecu-
tions followed federal prosecutions for essentially the same conduct. 109 In
104. See Waller v. Florida, 397 U.S. 387 (1970).
105. Justice Summers, author of Buckley, Cotton, and Smith, uses this term.
See State ex rel. Smith v. Phelps, 345 So. 2d 446, 450 (La. 1977); State v. Buckley,
344 So. 2d 980, 982 (La. 1977); State v. Cotton, 341 So. 2d 362, 365 (La. 1976).
106. 337 So. 2d at 1078.
107. 344 So. 2d 360 (La. 1977).
108. 348 So. 2d 983 (La. 1977).
109. Federal prosecutors are generally precluded from engaging in successive
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Forbes the defendant alleged that his plea of guilty to a federal indictment
charging him with bank robbery precluded his state prosecution for armed
robbery. The supreme court upheld the state's right to prosecute despite
the prior federal conviction. The court cited article 597 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure which clearly provides that a federal prosecution does
not bar state prosecution on grounds of double jeopardy. The court did not
extensively discuss the United States Supreme Court's decision in Bartkus
v. Illinois"10 other than to cite the case for the proposition that prosecution
by different sovereigns is constitutionally permissible.Ill
In State v. de la Beckwith ,112 the prior federal prosecution resulted in
an acquittal. The defendant thus contended that state prosecutors were
collaterally estopped from charging him with the state offense arising from
the same course of conduct." 3 The court said that collateral estoppel did
not apply because the matter in question was not being relitigated by the
same parties, but rather between a different sovereign (the State of
Louisiana) and the defendant. Thus whether an ultimate issue of fact was
resolved between the defendant and the United States was not critical.
Since the state was not a party to the prior prosecution, the state was not
collaterally estopped.
The writer cannot disagree with the court's analysis based on existing
statutes and precedent. However, a sense of fairness dictates that multiple
prosecutions not be engaged in absent a unique set of circumstances in
which justice would otherwise be subverted. For example, a state or
federal prosecutor should not be able to bar the other from a good faith
prosecution by securing an indictment for the sole purpose of dismissing it
after jeopardy had attached, thereby barring the other prosecution.
Nevertheless, in fairness to the accused, prosecutors ought to defer to one
another except in the most unique situations.
DOUBLE JEOPARDY-RETRIAL OF HABITUAL OFFENDER PROCEEDINGS
In State v. Hill,"I4 following his conviction for possession of heroin,
prosecutions following state prosecuti6ns for the same conduct by a long standing
policy of the United States Department of Justice. The Unites States Attorney must
secure approval if he wishes to seek a federal indictment of a defendant already
being prosecuted for the state offenses involved in his conduct. For a discussion of
that policy, see Rinaldi v. United States, 98 S. Ct. 81 (1977).
110. 359 U.S. 121 (1959).
111. 348 So. 2dat988.
112. 344 So. 2d 360 (La. 1977).
113. Both cases involved the defendant's alleged possession of explosives.
114. 340 So. 2d 309 (La. 1976).
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the defendant was charged as a habitual offender." 5 After hearing the
state's evidence, the trial judge found that the documents presented by the
state to prove the prior convictions were not properly authenticated. 116 The
trial court thus found the defendant "not guilty as a multiple offender."' 7
The district attorney filed a second bill and sought to prove by properly
authenticated documents the accused's prior felony convictions. The trial
court refused to permit the second proceeding and quashed the bill.
The supreme court felt that under the circumstances the state should
be given a second chance to establish the defendant's prior convictions.
The court found that double jeopardy did not bar the second proceeding
because the habitual offender proceeding is only an enhancement proceed-
ing and does not charge a criminal offense." 8 The court found that
principles of res judicata were applicable but were no bar to this second
proceeding because there was no direct determination of a fact or matter
distinctly put in issue. The original finding was based on the technical
inadequacy of the state's documentation and was not a conclusive determi-
nation of a fact distinctly put in issue." 9
By way of further discussion, the court said that the resolution of
certain matters in the defendant's favor, such as his identity as the person
who suffered the prior convictions, 120 would probably bar subsequent
proceedings on res judicata grounds.
Although the court's analysis is very logical, this writer feels that the
district attorney should be required to be prepared and to present his case
properly the first time.
CHARGING AND ARGUING TO THE JURY ON THE PENALTY
In State v. Blackwell,2' a closely divided supreme court decided on
rehearing that the trial court may allow or disallow argument on the
penalty provision applicable to the case being tried. Similarly, it was held
that the trial court could charge the jury regarding the penalty if it chose,
115. It was charged that he had four prior convictions.
116. See State v. Washington, 322 So. 2d 185 (La. 1975).
117. 340 So. 2d at 310.
118. See State v. Bullock, 329 So. 2d 733 (La. 1976); State v. Williams, 326 So.
2d 815 (La. 1976); State v. Alexander, 325 So. 2d 777 (La. 1976); State v. Boatner,
304 So. 2d 661 (La. 1974).
119. 340 So. 2d at 312.
120. Also mentioned in that category was the trial court's determination that
over five years had passed since defendant's final discharge from his prior convic-
tion. See State v. Anderson, 343 So. 2d 135 (La. 1977).
121. 298 So. 2d 798 (La. 1974).
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but was not required to do so even upon defendant's request. On original
hearing, in an opinion by former Justice Barham, the court held that a
charge describing the penalty had to be given if requested by the defend-
ant. On rehearing, Justice Calogero, writing for the majority, chose to
leave the matter to the sound discretion of the trial court. The theory of
Blackwell is sound. The jury in Louisiana plays no role in sentencing.
Except in capital cases, sentencing falls within the province of the judge,
not the jury. 122 The same logic could have applied in cases in which the
legislature vests the trial court with no sentencing discretion. There it
could be said the determination of sentencing is neither the function of the
court nor that of the jury, but rather has been predetermined by the
legislature. Although again a very close question, the majority of the court
in State v. Prater'23 thought otherwise, despite the language of the
opinion. Charged with distribution of heroin, Prater requested that the trial
court charge the jury that if convicted he faced a mandatory sentence of
life imprisonment. The trial court refused the charge. In Prater, the
opinion of the court, reflecting the view that the penalty is of no concern to
the jury, said:
Our jurisprudence is uniform in holding that the imposition of sen-
tence or the fixing of the punishment for conviction is solely within
the province of the judge and is not a function of the jury which is
concerned only with the determination of guilt or innocence of the
accused . . . . Likewise, we have held that sentence regulation,
such as those relating to mandatory terms, form no part of the
applicable law for the judge's charge to the jury.' 24
However, only three members125 subscribed to the court's opinion.
Three Justices dissented and a fourth concurred. 26
In his dissenting opinion Justice Calogero, author of Blackwell on
rehearing, distinguished cases such as Blackwell in which the penalty falls
within certain set limits' 27 and those in which a mandatory penalty is fixed
by statute leaving discretion neither to the trial court nor to the jury.
122. See LA. CODE CRIM. P. arts. 871, 905-905.9.
123. 337 So. 2d 1107 (La. 1976).
124. Id. at 1108.
125. The opinion by Justice Marcus was joined by Justice Summers and Chief
Justice Sanders.
126. Justices Dixon, Calogero, and Dennis dissented. Justice Tate concurred.
Justice Dennis replaced Justice Barham on his retirement.
127. Blackwell was charged with armed robbery which carried a penalty from
five to ninety-nine years imprisonment at hard labor. See also State v. Unzueto, 337
So. 2d 1102 (La. 1976).
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Justice Tate concurred only in that the view expressed by Justice
Calogero should apply to cases tried after the effective date of Prater.
Justice Tate said that he regarded the bench and bar as "on notice that in
the view of the majority . . . a charge and argument may be required and
permitted, despite Blackwell, when the statutory offense requires a man-
datory legislative penalty, with no judicial discretion as to its imposition
following verdict."' 28
In State v. Hodges,'29 a second degree murder case, 30 defense
counsel objected when the trial court refused to permit him to read the
penalty to the jury during his closing argument. The court affirmed with a
footnote 3 ' recognizing the fact that the case was tried prior to the Prater
decision. The footnote also noted a distinction between requiring the trial
court to charge the jury on the penalty and permitting defense counsel to
argue the penalty.
With deference to Justice Tate's concurrence in Prater, the writer
sees the difference as critical. Defense counsel may indeed wish to appeal
to the sympathy of the jury by pleading with them not to convict due to the
stringent consequences for the defendant.
Although the writer feels that the defendant has a right to have the
jury know that a mandatory life sentence will follow their verdict, this can
be accomplished by requiring the judge to include such information in his
charge. To allow defense counsel to argue penalty is to invite the jury to
acquit because the law is too harsh. 32 It is also an invitation to the district
attorney to argue the availability of pardons and commutation of sentence.
To permit such argument unnecessarily injects extraneous issues.
RIGHT TO APPEAL
In State v. McCarrol133 the defendant was brought to trial on an
indictment in which several counts, all charging misdemeanor offenses,
were joined. Following conviction, the defendant was sentenced to impri-
sonment. Although the sentence on each individual count did not exceed
128. 337 So. 2d at I 110. Justice Tate, writing for the court in State v. Milby, 345
So. 2d 18 (La. 1977), a second degree murder case with a mandatory life sentence,
tried before the date of Prater, expressed the same view for the court.
129. 349 So. 2d 250 (La. 1977).
130. The penalty was mandatory life imprisonment.
131. 349 So. 2d at 259 n.1.
132. This was Justice Dixon's view in his dissent in State v. Harris, 258 La. 720,
247 So. 2d 847 (1971).
133. 337 So. 2d 475 (La. 1976).
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six months, the defendant's total sentence did exceed six months. Citing
section 5(D) of article V of the Louisiana Constitution of 1974, the court
held that the defendant had the right to appeal to the Supreme Court of
Louisiana. In felony cases' 34 the defendant can appeal a conviction with-
out regard to the sentence imposed.' 35 However, under the state constitu-
tion, a convicted misdemeanant's right to appeal is conditioned upon the
sentence imposed. 36 Otherwise the defendant may only seek writs of
review under the supreme court's supervisory jurisdiction over the lower
courts. 137
In McCarroll, the high court held that in the case of multiple
misdemeanor offenses joined in a single indictment the aggregate of the
sentences actually imposed determines the right of appeal. If the total
sentence actually imposed for all counts combined exceeds six months
(also, presumably, if it exceeds five hundred dollars) the entire case is
appealable to the supreme court. As in the court's discussion in McCar-
roll3 ' of the right to trial by jury, the court treats the term "case" used in
section five of article five to apply to a single indictment including
multiple counts charging separate offenses.
TOTAL LACK OF EVIDENCE-REMANDS FOR NEW TRIAL
In State v. Elzie 139 and State v. Jackson"4 the state's highest court
applied the "total lack of evidence" standard to reverse convictions. Both
cases were tried before juries after the legislature abolished the directed
verdict in jury trials. The defendant challenged his conviction by moving
for a new trial' 4 ' in which it was contended that there existed a total lack of
evidence of an essential element of the offense.
134. Felony cases are those in which the defendant may be imprisoned at hard
labor. See LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 933.
135. LA. CONST. art. V, § 5.
136. Id. art. V, § 5(D) provides:
(D) Appellate Jurisdiction. In addition to other appeals provided by this
constitution, a case shall be appealable to the supreme court if (1) a law or
ordinance has been declared unconstitutional; (2) the defendant has been
convicted of a felony or a fine exceeding five hundred dollars or imprisonment
exceeding six months actually has been imposed.
137. Id. art. V, § 5(A).
138. See text at notes 40-51, supra.
139. 343 So. 2d 712 (La. 1977).
140. 344 So. 2d 961 (La. 1977).
141. In Jackson, the defendant actually moved for a judgment N.O.V. following
the verdict. This was treated as a motion for a new trial alleging a total lack of
evidence.
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In Elzie the accused was convicted of possession of cocaine with
intent to distribute. Proof that the defendant possessed .07 of an ounce of a
substance containing .01 per cent cocaine was evident. The state offered
evidence which further showed that such amount was sufficient for twenty
individual cocaine uses. Based on this evidence, the jury convicted. The
state argued that the jury had some evidence from which it could infer a
specific intent to distribute the drug.
The supreme court found a "total lack of evidence" from which the
jury could infer that the defendant possessed the requisite intent and
reversed. The court decision noted the reasonable hypothesis of inno-
cence 142 standard as to circumstantial evidence' 43 and said that whether
"every reasonable hypothesis of innocence has been excluded presents a
question of law."144
Similarly, in State v. Jackson,' 45 the court reversed the defendant's
conviction as an accessory after the fact, finding that the facts presented
showed no evidence of that offense. In Jackson, the accused discovered
that three others had burglarized various business places. In return for not
reporting the culprits, the accused was given money and other valuables.
Although the court suggested that the accused may have been guilty
of receiving stolen property' 46 or compounding a felony, 147 his mere
failure to report the offenses, formerly punished as misprision,148 was not
sufficient to render him an accessory after the fact. 149
142. LA. R.S. 15:438 (1950) provides:
§438. Circumstantial evidence.
The rule as to circumstantial evidence is: assuming every fact to be proved
that the evidence tends to prove, in order to convict, it must exclude every
reasonable hypothesis of innocence.
143. "For purposes of appellate review, the issue before us then is whether
there is some evidence from which the jury could reasonably conclude that beyond
a reasonable doubt the accused in the present instance possessed the cocaine with
intent to distribute it. Stated another way, did the evidence before the jury,
reasonably accepted by it, exclude as a matter of law every other reasonable
hypothesis, such as that the accused possessed the cocaine for personal consump-
tion rather than for distribution to others?" 343 So. 2d at 715.
144. 343 So. 2d at 714.
145. 344 So. 2d 961 (La. 1977).
146. LA. R.S. 14:69 (Supp. 1972).
147. Id. 14:131 (1950).
148. The court noted that section 856 of the Revised Statutes of 1870 did make
criminal the mere failure to report crime. 344 So. 2d at 963. The offense was
repealed in 1942 when the present criminal code was enacted.
149. 344 So. 2d at 963.
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The writer concurs in the direction the court has taken in reviewing
under the total lack of evidence standard. The court indicates in Elzie a
willingness to build into the test the circumstantial evidence rule. Where
the evidence is so weak that the supreme court (or the trial court) finds that
no reasonable juror could find proof beyond a reasonable doubt (or that the
proof excludes every reasonable hypothesis of innocence, whatever the
applicable test), the conviction should not stand. 150
The writer further feels that reference to a total lack of evidence
standard for review purposes should be abandoned. In effect, the supreme
court is reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence presented in the trial
court. If the evidence is insufficient to support the burden of proof
required by law, a question of law' 5' is presented. Conceptually it would
be more satisfactory if the court would rearticulate the standard for
reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence presented on the question of
guilt or innocence.
Another problem not disposed of in either Elzie or Jackson relates to
the lack of a directed verdict in jury cases. In both Elzie and Jackson a
new trial was granted, thereby presumably allowing the state an opportuni-
ty to supply proof of the missing element. In Elzie, Justice Tate noted the
unresolved issue regarding the application of double jeopardy principles
should the state reprosecute the accused for possession of cocaine with
intent to distribute.
In cases in which absence of the missing element does not affect the
defendant's guilt of a lesser included offense, the court should consider
simply affirming the conviction of the lesser offense, and remanding for
resentence.1 52 In cases like Jackson, where such a result would not be
possible, the court, as Justice Tate correctly suggests, must wrestle with
the double jeopardy question in the event of retrial for the same offense.
MULTIPLE OFFENDER DWI PROSECUTIONS
In State v. Neal'53 the defendant was apprehended on January 4,
1976 while allegedly operating a vehicle under the influence of alcohol.
On May 11, 1976 he was again accused of operating his vehicle under the
influence. At the time he had not yet been convicted of the January DWI.
Following the May arrest, he pled guilty to the January DWI. The district
150. See State v. Finley, 341 So. 2d 381 (La. 1976).
151. See LA. CONST. art. V, § 5.
152. See State v. Shaffer, 260 La. 605, 257 So. 2d 121 (1971).
153. 347 So. 2d 1139 (La. 1977).
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attorney then charged that on May 11, 1976 he was guilty of second
offense DWI.
The supreme court held that he could not be charged as a second
offender, because the first conviction did not precede the second transgres-
sion. The court reasoned that because the first conviction must be alleged
and proved, the conviction itself (not merely the underlying conduct) must
have occurred prior to the conduct which subjects the offender to the
enhanced penalty 154 for second offense DWI. Writing for the court, Justice
Tate said:
Traditional American principles of criminal responsibility of an
individual for his conduct do not permit the state to convert a formal
charge against him for a less serious offense, into a charge for a more
serious offense, on the legal basis of a change of status or other
incident which occurs after the initial offense charged. Criminal
conduct ordinarily subjects an individual to the imposition of criminal
penalties applicable to the act at the time it is committed. 55
As in State v. Cox, 156 State v. Taylor, 157 and State v. Sanders,15 the
court has correctly resolved a question of legislative intent in favor of the
154. LA. R.S. 14:98 (Supp. 1975) provides:
A. Operating a vehicle while intoxicated is the operating of any motor
vehicle, aircraft, vessel or other means of conveyance while under the influ-
ence of alcoholic beverages, narcotic drugs, central nervous system stimulants,
hallucinogenic drugs or barbiturates.
B. Whoever operates a vehicle while intoxicated is guilty of a crime and
upon conviction shall be fined not less than one hundred twenty-fiye dollars
and not more than four hundred dollars or imprisoned in the parish jail for not
less than thirty days nor more than six months or both.
C. On a second conviction, the offender shall be fined not less than one
hundred twenty-five dollars nor more than five hundred dollars and shall be
imprisoned for not less than one hundred twenty-five days nor more than six
months.
D. On a third conviction, the offender shall be imprisoned with or without
hard labor for not less than one year nor more than five years, and may be fined
not more than one thousand dollars.
E. On a fourth conviction, the offender shall be sentenced to imprison-
ment at hard labor for not less than ten nor more than thirty years.
F. Provided that any offense under the statute committed more than five
years prior to the commission of the crime for which the defendant is being
tried shall not be considered in the assessment of penalties hereunder.
155. 347 So. 2d at 1141.
156. 344 So. 2d 1024 (La. 1977).
157. 347 So. 2d 172 (La. 1977).
158. 337 So. 2d 1131 (La. 1976).
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accused. This is clearly a question which the legislature can resolve with
an amendment should they disagree with the court's approach. The statute
could be drafted so that the second instance of such conduct subjects the
defendant to the greater penalty although he has not yet been convicted for
the first instance of the conduct.
HABITUAL OFFENDER PROCEEDINGS-LEGISLATIVE INTENT
A series of cases' 59 dealt with the application of enhancement of
penalty proceedings to convictions for offenses which include as an
essential element a prior felony conviction. " In State v. Sanders, follow-
ing the defendant's conviction for being a convicted felon in possession of
a firearm, 161 the state filed a multiple offender bill of information. Similar-
ly, the state filed a multiple offender bill of information in State v. Cox,
following the defendant's conviction for simple escape from the Depart-
ment of Corrections. 62 In both cases, the court quashed the enhancement
proceedings on the theory that the legislature must have intended that
procedure to apply to such convictions. The decisions noted that in both
situations conduct which would not be felonious, perhaps not even crimi-
nal, was in effect deemed by the legislature to constitute a felony because
the person had suffered a prior felony conviction. The court felt that the
legislature must not have intended that the habitual offender provisions
should apply because to do so would be doubly to enhance the penalty for
the conduct. The conduct is deemed felonious in the first place because of
the prior conviction. To permit the penalty prescribed for that conduct to
be further enhanced because of the same prior conviction was deemed
impermissible absent a clear showing that the legislature intended such a
result. The effect is to hold that the legislature must not have intended that
the prior convictions could serve both as an element of the offense and to
enhance the sentence.
159. State v. Taylor, 347 So. 2d 172 (La. 1977); State v. Cox, 344 So. 2d 1024
(La. 1977); State v. Sanders, 337 So. 2d 1131 (La. 1976).
160. LA. R.S. 14:110 (Supp. 1972) (simple escape); id. 14:95.1 (Supp. 1975)
(possession of a firearm by a convicted felon).
161. The statute, LA. R.S. 14:95.1 (Supp. 1975), prohibits those convicted of
certain felonies from passing firearms or carrying concealed weapons. Sanders had
previously been convicted of attempted simple burglary and armed robbery.
162. Cox was convicted of escaping (See LA. R.S. I 10(A) (Supp. 1972)) from
Jackson Barracks Work Release Program, when he was serving a sentence follow-
ing his conviction for simple burglary. A felony conviction only may result in a
sentence to the custody of the Department of Corrections. See LA. CODE CRIM. P.
art. 933; LA. R.S. 15:824 (Supp. 1976).
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In State v. Taylor,163 without a lengthy discussion, the court refused
to allow the state to use a prior felony escape conviction to enhance a
single kidnapping conviction, relying on its rationale in Cox and Sanders.
With deference, the writer sees a significant difference. In Taylor, the
felony conviction (simple kidnapping) enhanced by the escape conviction
was not one which requires as one of its elements a prior conviction. This
was not, of course, the situation in Cox or Sanders. However, the court
may regard offenses which themselves have as elements a prior felony
conviction as status offenses; on this basis it may be logical to hold that
such offenses can neither be enhanced nor be used to enhance.
The writer agrees with Justice Dennis, author of Cox, in his approach
to the problem. Criminal statutes are strictly construed and, in instances
where there is an "absence of express legislative intent," 161 doubts should
be resolved in favor of the defendant's interest. 165
HABITUAL OFFENDER PROCEEDINGS-THE EFFECT
OF THE "AUTOMATIC PARDON"
In State v. Selmon, 66 it was held that the pardon provided for first
offenders in article I, section 20 of the Constitution of Louisiana does not
prevent the "pardoned" conviction from being used to enhance punish-
ment. The court distinguished the pardon provided in Louisiana Constitu-
tion article I, section 20, from a full gubernatorial pardon in that the
former only restores rights of citizenship 67 whereas the latter restores the
"status of innocence." 1 68 Thus the earlier cases 169 holding that a gover-
nor's pardon precludes the use of the pardoned conviction for enhance-
ment purposes were distinguished.
HABITUAL OFFENDER PROCEEDINGS-THE FIVE YEAR RULE
State v. Anderson170 held that the five year "cleansing period"'
171
163. 347 So. 2d 172 (La. 1977).
164. 344 So. 2d at 1026.
165. Justice Dennis also discusses the "principle of lenity" in State v. McCar-
roll, 337 So. 2d 475 (La. 1976).
166. 343 So. 2d 720 (La. 1977).
167. Id. at 722.
168. Id. at 721.
169. State v. Childers, 197 La. 715, 2 So. 2d 189 (1941); State v. Lee, 171 La.
744, 132 So. 219 (1931).
170. 349 So. 2d 311 (La. 1977).
171. Id. at 313. See LA. R.S. 15:529.1(F) (Supp. 1958).
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following which a conviction 172 cannot be used to enhance the penalty for
subsequent convictions 173 begins to run when the defendant is actually
discharged from his sentence. Anderson was released from prison with
good time credits 74 on June 19, 1970. His sentence without such credit
would not have expired until September 4, 1972. On August 2, 1975, over
five years after his release from prison, Anderson committed an armed
robbery. The earlier conviction was used to enhance the sentence. Because
the supreme court held that the date of his actual discharge with good time
credit was "the expiration of the maximum sentence," 1 75 the five years
had expired. Under the terms of the statute, therefore, the earlier convic-
tion could not be used to enhance the sentence. If it had been determined
that the "maximum sentence" had expired on September 4, 1972, the date
on which he would have been released absent credit for good behavior,
then the five year period would not have run.
The determination that the phrase "expiration of the maximum sen-
tence" means the actual date of final discharge from state custody seems
to be logical and in keeping with the "five year rule." As the court noted
in dictum, the inmate released on parole is not finally discharged. He is
still subject to state supervision, and his release is only conditional. Thus
his maximum sentence has not been served until the termination of his
parole. The five year period does not begin to run, under Anderson, until
the defendant's debt to society is paid.
Again the court has resolved an issue of statutory construction in
favor of the defendant 176 because the legislative purpose either is not clear
or seems to favor the defendant's contention. The result is a fair one. If the
172. Anderson was convicted of a felony and sentenced to 5 years and 6 months
at hard labor on March 3, 1967. 349 So. 2d at 313.
173. LA. R.S. 15:529.1(C) (Supp. 1956) provides that its provisions permitting
enhanced sentence upon a subsequent conviction, because of prior offenses, "shall
not be applicable in cases where more than five years have elapsed since the
expiration of the maximum sentence, or sentences, of the previous conviction, or
convictions, and the time of the commission of the last felony for which he has been
convicted. In computing the period of time as provided herein, any period of
servitude by a person in a penal institution, within or without the state, shall not be
included in the computation of any of said five year periods." See 349 So. 2d at 312
n.4.
174. At the time of Anderson's conviction prisoners were entitled to diminution
of sentence for good behavior. LA. R.S. 15:571.3 (Supp. 1975).
175. LA. R.S. 15:529.1(C) (Supp. 1956).
176. See State v. Neal, 347 So. 2d 1139 (La. 1977); State v. Cox, 344 So. 2d 1024
(La. 1977); State v. Sanders, 337 So. 2d 1131 (La. 1976).
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legislature determines that a longer period should be involved or that a
different method of computing the five years should be devised, it is free
to amend the applicable statutes.
In State v. Schamburge, 1" 7 the defendant was sentenced for several
felonies'7 8 on the same date. Under an earlier case, 179 the convictions only
counted as one for the purpose of enhancing the penalty for subsequent
convictions. However, in determining the date on which the five year
"cleansing period" 8 0 began to run, the court computed the total impri-
sonment to be served. "I Since the three convictions are considered as one,
the supreme court considered the total for all three to determine "the
actual number of years'which the [trial] court sentenced defendant to serve
for his wrongdoing." 8 2
The result seems logical. The three sentences were consecutive so
they were added. Should a future case arise in which the sentences were
concurrent, the writer assumes that the court would again look to the
"actual number of years" to be served in determining when the five year
"cleansing period" would begin to run.
HABITUAL OFFENDER PROCEEDINGS-' 'THE SILENT RECORD"
In State v. Hoffman,' 83 following the defendant's conviction of
attempted aggravated rape, the state sought to have the penalty enhanced
in a habitual offender proceeding. On original hearing, although affirming
the conviction, the supreme court set the enhanced sentence aside and
remanded to the trial court for resentencing. On rehearing, however, the
conviction was reversed on unrelated grounds, and the matter was remand-
ed for a new trial.
On original hearing, the enhanced sentence was set aside because the
records of the prior felony convictions used to enhance were silent as to
the presence or waiver of counsel representing defendant. The court
followed the same logic as it had earlier followed in City of Monroe v.
Fincher.'84 In that case, the state was not allowed to use a prior DWI
177. 344 So. 2d 997 (La. 1977).
178. The defendant was convicted of three simple burglaries on Feb. 27, 1964.
On June 30, 1964, he was sentenced to three consecutive terms of imprisonment.
179. State ex rel. Jackson v. Henderson, 283 So. 2d 210 (La. 1973).
180. See text at notes 170-75, supra.
181. The total for all three was eight years. The sentences were consecutive, not
concurrent. See LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 883.
182. 344 So. 2d at 1002.
183. 345 So. 2d I (La. 1977) (on original hearing).
184. 305 So. 2d 108 (La. 1974).
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conviction to enhance the penalty where the record of the prior conviction
"does not establish that he had counsel or had made a waiver of
counsel. " 85 It was seen as the state's burden to establish the presence of
counsel or, absent that, a valid waiver of counsel. In Hoffman, the
supreme court said that in the absence of such a showing "such convic-
tions cannot serve to enhance the penalty under the multiple offender
statute.' 1186
Because the conviction was reversed on rehearing, no resentence was
ultimately required. However, in the event of a new conviction, the state
might then attempt to build the record required by the court on original
hearing. In such a case the court would have to decide whether to allow the
state to go beyond the silent record in establishing the presence or waiver
of counsel. The Hoffman decision, citing City of Monroe v. Coleman,' 87
indicates that if the record of the earlier conviction does not reflect the
presence or waiver of counsel, the conviction may not be used."'
APPELLATE REVIEW OF SENTENCE
Despite a series of cases'8 9 raising the issue, the supreme court's duty
to review sentences for excessiveness under article I, section 20 of the
state constitution remains unclear. 190
The decisions in State v. Bryant'9' and State v. Williams"9 do
clarify one point. In order to present the issue, a contemporaneous objec-
tion must be made to the sentence. 193 The objection calls to the trial court's
attention the defendant's complaint and, as is traditionally the function of
the contemporaneous objection rule, allows the trial judge the opportunity
to correct his own error, if indeed, there is error.
185. 345 So. 2d at 4.
186. Id.
187. 304 So. 2d 332 (La. 1974).
188. See State ex rel. LeBlanc v. Henderson, 261 La. 315, 259 So. 2d 557 (1972).
See also LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 514 (requires the minutes to reflect the presence of
counsel or that the court informed the defendant of his right to court appointed
counsel); State v. Coody, 275 So. 2d 773 (La. 1973).
189. State v. Bryant, 347 So. 2d 227 (La. 1977); State v. Norris, 347 So. 2d 225
(La. 1977); State v. Williams, 341 So. 2d 370 (La. 1976); State ex rel. Robertson v.
Maggio, 341 So. 2d 366 (La. 1976); State v. Williams, 340 So. 2d 1382 (La. 1976);
State v. Hatter, 338 So. 2d 100 (La. 1976).
190. The writer strongly favors appellate review of sentence.
191. 347 So. 2d 227 (La. 1977).
192. 340 So. 2d 1382 (La. 1976).
193. LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 841.
19781
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
In State v. Norris,"' the defendant contended that the trial judge did
not afford him adequate opportunity to contradict and explain unfavorable
material in the presentence investigation report. The supreme court re-
fused to consider the contention due to the failure of defense counsel to
object and request access to the presentence report.' 95 The opinions
speculated that such a request might have prompted the trial court to
disclose such factual contents and conclusions and to allow the defendant
to controvert contested material.
In two cases, sentences were imposed following trials after unsuc-
cessful plea negotiations. 196 In State v. Frank 197 the district attorney, the
trial judge and defense counsel discussed pleas and possible sentences.
The defendant was charged with armed robbery. The trial judge agreed to
impose a sentence of twenty years should a guilty plea be entered. The
defendant, apparently not satisfied with the offer, elected to go to trial.
Following conviction, a sentence of thirty-three years was imposed.
The trial judge, in a per curiam, outlined the factors considered in
imposing the sentence. He noted the defendant's attitude during trial, the
severity of the offense, the risk of its repetition, and the severe maximum
penalty. 918 The trial judge also noted his desire to facilitate endeavors to
plea bargain in aid of the prompt disposition of cases and his feeling that
"guilty pleas manifest a feeling of repentance."'99
The court rejected the defendant's contention that a sentence after
trial which exceeds that offered in the event of a guilty plea violates due
process. The supreme court said that "[a] judge's disposition to impose a
lenient sentence during plea discussions should not be understood as
setting a limit for the justifiable sentence .... ,,200
Although only three justices joined the opinion of the court, 20 the
views expressed seem sound provided that the trial judge gives his reasons
194. 347 So. 2d 225 (La. 1977).
195. Code of Criminal Procedure article 877 provides confidentiality for such
reports. Compare LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 877 with FED. R. CRIM. P. 32. See also
State v. Hatter, 338 So. 2d 100 (La. 1976).
196. State v. Frank, 344 So. 2d 1039 (La. 1977); State v. Williams, 341 So. 2d 370
(La. 1976).
197. 344 So. 2d 1039 (La. 1977).
198. Id. at 1045.
199. Id. at 1045 n.i.
200. Id. at 1045.
201. Two concurred without assigning reasons. Justices Tate and Calogero
concurred in part and dissented in part feeling that the matter should be remanded
for a sentencing hearing.
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for the longer sentence so that the supreme court may review those
reasons. The Frank decision correctly seems to view the trial judge's offer
of leniency to one who accepts his guilt as appropriate. Should a trial
judge use the threat of increased sentences as a device to coerce guilty
pleas, the supreme court's review of the factors assigned as justifying the
sentence imposed would presumably reveal the unfairness. It should not
be presumed, however, that trial judges will engage in tactics designed to
coerce guilty pleas, nor that judges will hold against a defendant the fact
that he exercises his constitutional right to a trial. If the record" 2 does not
support the greater sentence, the supreme court must and surely will
remand with instructions to reduce the sentence.
In State v. Williams 203 both the district attorney and defense counsel
recommended that the trial judge impose a nine year sentence should the
defendant plead to the armed robbery with which he was charged. 21 The
trial judge refused and the case was tried. Following conviction, the trial
court imposed a sixty year sentence. Upon defense objection to the
sentence, the trial judge commented that he did not consider nine years
adequate for armed robbery and that he would not have considered impos-
ing a sentence of less than thirty-five years. 20
5
The defendant objected on the ground that the trial judge refused to
exercise the discretion vested in him by the legislature. The supreme court
found this to be a serious contention and said that the trial judge would
have been in error had he abdicated his "responsibility to exercise the
sound discretion mandated by the legislature.-206 However, the court did
not feel that facts presented reflected the trial judge's "refusal .... to
give consideration to the full range of penalty prescribed by the legisla-
ture. ' 207
In State ex rel. Robertson v. Maggio208 the court did express concern
with the failure of the trial court to exercise the sentencing discretion
vested in him by law. In Robertson, the trial court, following a hearing,
209
202. The writer agrees with Justice Tate's view that a sentencing hearing should
be conducted on the record and would have also favored remand for such a hearing.
203. 341 So. 2d 370 (La. 1976).
204. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11, regarding the United States Attorney and defense
counsel's entering into plea agreements respecting sentence recommendations.
205. 341 So. 2d at 379.
206. Id. at 380.
207. Id.
208. 341 So. 2d 366 (La. 1976).
209. The hearing was constitutionally deficient for other reasons and such defi-
ciency required remand for a new hearing.
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revoked defendant's probation and imposed a five year sentence. In
imposing sentence, the trial judge's remarks indicated his feeling that he
must revoke probation and impose sentence even if the violation of the
conditions of probation was minor. 210 The supreme court noted the trial
court's discretion to revoke, reprimand, intensify supervision, or add
conditions of probation in the event of a violation of probation condi-
tions.21 By remanding to the trial court for reconsideration, Robertson
clearly appears to require the record to reflect the "exercise of judicial
discretion. "212
Whether the supreme court will review the results of an exercise of
discretion in sentencing remains an unanswered question. Nevertheless,
the court has at least indicated its willingness to review the record to assure
that the trial court does not disregard the discretion vested in it by the
legislature. In view of the enactment of article 894. 1213 giving legislative
guidelines for and requiring a record of the exercise of the trial court's
discretion in sentencing, a review of the manner in which that discretion is
exercised should follow as the next logical step. Under its general super-
visory authority, 214 the supreme court has an obligation to review the
exercise of all discretionary decisions by the lower courts. This duty would
seem to require review of the discretion exercised in the imposition of
sentences.
210. 341 So. 2d at 368.
211. Id. at 369. See LA. CODE CRIM.P. art. 900.
212. 341 So. 2d at 370.
213. See 1977 La. Acts, No. 635; LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 894.1.
214. LA. CONST. art. V, § 5.
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